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Abstract This paper examines the possibilities of
developing agri-environmental policy measures in Israel,
focusing on market-oriented instruments. A conceptual
framework for developing agri-environmental policy
measures is presented, ﬁrst in very broad lines (mandatory
regulations, economic instruments and advisory measures)
and subsequently focusing on economic instruments, and
speciﬁcally, on market-oriented ones. Two criteria of
choice between the measures are suggested: their contri-
bution to improving the effectiveness of the policy; and the
feasibility of their implementation. This is the framework
used for analyzing agri-environmental measures in Israel.
Israel currently implements a mix of mandatory regula-
tions, economic instruments and advisory measures to
promote the agri-environment. The use of additional eco-
nomic instruments may improve the effectiveness of the
policy. When comparing the effectiveness of various eco-
nomic measures, we found that the feasibility of imple-
mentation of market-oriented instruments is greater, due to
the Israeli public’s preference for strengthening market
orientation in the agricultural sector. Four market-oriented
instruments were practiced in a pilot project conducted in
an Israeli rural area. We found that in this case study, the
institutional feasibility and acceptance by stakeholders
were the major parameters inﬂuencing the implementation
of the market-oriented instruments, whereas the instru-
ments’ contribution to enhancing the ecological or
economic effectiveness were hardly considered by the
stakeholders as arguments in favor of their use.
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Introduction
As agriculture occupies close to 40% of the world’s land
area, its impact on environmental resources is considerable.
In order to guide this inﬂuence, many countries have
established diverse policy measures, including mandatory
regulations, economic instruments and advisory measures.
Agri-environmental payment schemes comprise a central
economic instrument. Although these schemes vary
markedly between countries, they mostly share the same
core concept: farmers are paid to modify their cultivation
or livestock husbandry in order to protect, maintain or
support environmental resources (Engel and others 2008;
OECD 2005; Smith 2006).
Recently,the integrationofmarket economy components
into these schemes has been advocated by academics and
policy makers (Gerowitt and others 2003a, b; Hampicke
2006).Market-orientedinstrumentsaresupposedtoimprove
the ecological and economic effectiveness of the schemes
(Kleijn and others 2006; Kleijn and Sutherland 2003;
Marggraf 2003; von Haaren and Bathke 2008; von Haaren
and Bills 2007).
Agri-environmental policy measures are now being
practiced in developed, as well as developing countries
(Ferraro 2009; Wunder and others 2008), and it is probable
that they will be introduced into an ever growing number of
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tal policy measures, and especially market-oriented ones,
are explored here, using Israel as a case study. The expe-
rience gained in other countries, especially in the EU, will
be used as a benchmark.
The comparison between the agri-environmental poli-
cies of the EU and Israel seems at ﬁrst glance questionable,
as the EU is a much larger entity than the State of Israel,
and practices a highly heterogeneous agri-environmental
policy. However, as some agri-environmental policies in
the EU are implemented on a small scale (e.g., in a German
federal state or a small EU-member state like Luxembourg
or Slovenia), their relevancy to Israel seems justiﬁed.
Without question, the policy of the EU is more complex,
but some of its aims and instruments are highly relevant to
Israel.
The paper proposes a conceptual framework for devel-
oping agri-environmental policy measures, and then follows
this framework when reﬂecting on the current agri-envi-
ronmental policy in Israel and potential future alternatives
that were explored in a pilot project, with references to the
experience acquired in the EU and other countries.
Conceptual Framework
The paper is organized as a discussion on how to choose
policy measures in order to address agri-environmental
problems. Our conceptual framework is detailed in Fig. 1.
We start our discussion in very broad terms, presenting the
three main avenues of policy interventions that a govern-
ment may implement in order to tackle the agri-environ-
ment issue: mandatory regulations, economic instruments
and advisory measures. Once the economic measures
are selected, the policy maker is presented with a range
of economic instruments to choose from. These
include: centrally-planned payment schemes, market-ori-
ented schemes, taxes and charges, eco-labeling, tradable
permits, etc.
The main economic agri-environmental measures that
will be considered in this paper are centrally-planned
payment schemes and market-oriented payment schemes.
The ﬁrst forms the widespread agri-environmental payment
model, which has been practiced in the EU for about two
decades (Baylis and others 2008; Dobbs and Pretty 2004;
European Commission 2005, 2006; Kleijn and Sutherland
2003). According to this model, farmers voluntarily take
upon themselves environmental commitments in exchange
for payment set by the authorities. A market-oriented
payment scheme, in contrast, is a decentralized model that
emphasises competition between farmers for the delivery of
environmental services, and local decisions over the eco-
nomic parameters of the scheme. This innovative approach,
aswillbedetailedlaterinthispaper,iscurrentlypracticedin
some countries and regions within mainstream policy, as
well as in experimental settings (Bertke and others 2005;
Klimek and others 2008; von Haaren and Bathke 2008;
Wittig and others 2006).
As we proceed, we examine a range of market-oriented
agri-environmental instruments. These include result-ori-
entation, conservation auctions, participatory approach in
setting the economic parameters of the scheme and local
organization. These instruments will be detailed later in the
paper and their advantages and disadvantages discussed.
We suggest two criteria of choice between agri-envi-
ronmental policy measures: effectiveness—does the policy
measure improve the ability to achieve the requested
results?; and feasibility—does the policy measure stand a
good chance of being implemented?. We classify these
criteria into a number of sub-criteria: the sub-criteria of
effectiveness are ecological effectiveness—does the policy
measure improve the ecological results?; and economic
effectiveness—does the measure improve the ability to
achieve the results at minimum costs?. The sub-criteria of
feasibility are: institutional feasibility—does the measure
ﬁt the existing governmental institutions, regulations etc.?;
acceptance by farmers—are the farmers willing to support
the implementation of the measure?; and acceptance by the
public at large—does the measure ﬁt the public under-
standing of the way the agri-environment should be
addressed?. These criteria of choice seem to be relevant to
all levels of the conceptual framework.
We examine this conceptual framework in the Israeli
case, looking into various decision cross-roads in the
design of agri-environmental policy in this country, and
reﬂecting on lessons learned within previous cases in the
EU and other places.
Methods
The ﬁndings presented here are based on an analysis of a
multitude of sources, relating to both the European and the
Israeli cases. These include the study of documents, such as
government reports, statistical data, master plans and
position papers issued by various organizations. In addi-
tion, the study builds on the involvement of one author (L.
Amdur) in a process led by academics and professionals in
Israel aiming to establish agri-environmental payment
schemes; this involvement enabled gaining insights and
interpretations of stakeholders’ opinions. The analysis of
the market-oriented agri-environmental instruments, as
practiced in the EU, is also based on the authors’ experi-
ence in the implementation of a market-oriented agri-
environmental scheme as a pilot project, among other
sources.
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ented agri-environmental instruments in Israel is based on a
pilot project conducted in 2008–2009 at the Megido
Regional Council. This is a rural authority located in
northern Israel and consisting of 13 villages, 9 of which are
communal villages (kibbutzim) and 4 are family-farms
villages (moshavim). Altogether, there are around 35 active
farms in this regional authority, including the communal
farms of the kibbutzim, together cultivating around 3,600
hectares (ICBS 2008). Most of the area of the regional
council is designated for nature reserves and national
parks; recently, this council initiated the designation of its
entire geographical area as a biosphere reserve.
The undulating topography of the terrain, combined
with intensive ﬁeld-crops cultivation, leads to problems of
soil erosion. In order to mitigate the soil erosion, the
Ministry of Agriculture has developed a plan to convert
crop ﬁelds into fruit tree plantations, as a means of
establishing permanent vegetation on the ﬁelds and bene-
ﬁting from the soil protection offered by the trees’ cano-
pies. The pilot project was integrated into this general
plan. As olive groves were found to contribute to biodi-
versity protection (Pe’er and others 2006) and were pre-
ferred by the Israeli public owing to their visual quality
(Misgav 2000), they were chosen as the type of plantation
to be promoted within the framework of the project. When
cultivated with grass cover between the rows of trees, the
erosion in the olive groves is minimized (Gomez and
others 2004); this form of soil management was included
in the guidelines for cultivating the groves within the pilot
project.
Based on the project managers’ understanding of the
current political atmosphere in Israel, it was decided to use
market-based agri-environmental instruments in the pilot
project. The reasoning for this choice will be discussed in
depth later in this paper.
Our study consisted of in-depth interviews with the pilot
project stakeholders, using open-ended questions and fol-
low-up probes.Theinterviewsfocusedonunderstandingthe
current institutional framework relating toagri-environment
in Israel, as well as the interviewees’ attitudes towards agri-
environmental schemes and the market-oriented compo-
nents proposed within the pilot project. The intention was to
interview all the relevant stakeholders of the project. Alto-
gether, 30 stakeholders were interviewed: these included
all the farming managers in kibbutzim and moshavim
(12 interviewees, 11 of which were men). All active family
farmers in the regional council were contacted, however
only 9 (8 of which were men) were relevant for the project
(i.e., cultivated crops) andwerewillingtobe interviewed. In
addition, all the members of the project’s steering commit-
tee, consisting of local and national level decision makers
with either agricultural, planning or environmental orienta-
tions, were interviewed (a total of 9 interviewees). As per-
forming a large survey of public attitudes was beyond the
scope of this study, we will consider here the attitudes of
the policy makers as reﬂecting (to a certain extent) those of
the public at large.
The interviews with the farmers were structured as fol-
lows: ﬁrst their perception of agri-environmental services,
and their attitude towards public remuneration of these
services, were discussed. Subsequently, the framework of
the pilot project was presented and discussed, focusing on
the farmers’ attitudes towards the market-oriented com-
ponents included in the project. The interviews with the
policy makers followed the same lines, and furthermore—
the integration of market-oriented instruments into the
administrative operations in Israel was discussed. The
interviews lasted 45 minutes to 2 hours each. In addition,
the meetings of the project’s steering committee and a
public hearing in which 20 farmers participated were
recorded and analyzed.
Fig. 1 A conceptual framework
for developing
agri-environmental policy
measures
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lyzed using MAXQDA2007 software. This software assists
in assigning codes to text segments, and in their retrieval
according to codes, interviewee’s attributes, etc.
Protecting the Agri-Environment in Israel: Mandatory
Regulations, Economic Instruments or Advisory
Measures?
The Necessity of Supporting the Agri-Environment
in Israel
Arable land comprises approximately 25% of the total area
of Israel (ICBS 2006). Agriculture currently plays a minor
role in this country, both economically and as a way of life.
Only 1.8% of the country’s total net domestic product
derives from cultivation (although related industries
account for a larger share of the economy), only 2% of the
labor force is employed in agriculture, and less than 9% of
the population lives in rural areas (ICBS 2006). Israel
imports a large share of the food required to ﬁll its con-
sumption needs (ICBS 2006); ‘‘food independence’’ is
hardly achievable given the local semi-arid climate and the
population size of over 7 million.
Israel is a highly urbanized country. More than 90% of
the population resides in urban settlements (ICBS 2006), in
comparison with 50% of the population in the EU (EU
2003). The population density in Israel is relatively high:
around 305 people/km
2 (ICBS 2006), as is the population
growth rate (1.9% annually during 2001–2005). From the
mid-1980s, a gradual process began, in which the economic
viability of local agriculture declined, while urbanization of
the core area sharply increased. This led to the perception of
agricultural ﬁelds less as a source of livelihood for the
farmers and more as suppliers of open space amenities to
urban dwellers (Feitelson 1999). Most of the open areas
surrounding the urbanized core in Israel are designated for
agriculture, whereas nature reserves, national parks or
protected forests are located at a greater distance (Fig. 2).
Willingness-to-pay surveys identify a steady demand for the
aesthetic amenities of agricultural landscapes in Israel
(Fleischer and others 1997; Shemesh-Adani 2003; Shirizly
2001). The values obtained within the framework of dif-
ferent studies are in the same range, demonstrating that the
Israeli public is consistent in its demand for agri-environ-
mental visual amenities (see Table 1). Moreover, some
studies found that the Israeli public prefers the visual
qualities of agricultural ﬁelds or plantations to those of
Mediterranean savannasorGarrigue (Misgav 2000; Shirizly
2001), which comprise the landscape that will probably
develop if cultivation is abandoned, at least in the short and
medium term (Preiss and others 1997).
Other agri-environmental services that were studied in
the Israeli context include protection of biodiversity (Pe’er
and others 2006), improved inﬁltration of rainwater into
ploughed land, absorption of organic solid waste and
treated wastewater (Zaban and others 2004). Zaban and
others (2004) estimated the total value of the environ-
mental services of the Israeli agriculture at US$ 730 per
hectare.
The necessity of supporting the agri-environment in
Israel derives from the need to mitigate threats to the
supply of agri-environmental services and the negative
impact of agriculture on the environment.
The threats to the supply of agri-environmental services
emerge from processes of urbanization and abandonment
Fig. 2 Agriculture in proximity to Israeli urban areas. Source of map:
Authors, based on data of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics
(2002)
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123of ﬁelds. Around 65% of the development in Israel takes
place at the expense of agricultural land (Frenkel 2001). In
the labor market, only 12% of rural employment presently
remains in agriculture, in comparison with 31% in 1984
(Sofer and Applebaum 2006). The abandonment of agri-
cultural cultivation is widespread, as approximately 13%
of the agricultural land in the country has not been farmed
for long periods of time, and there are no plans for its
re-cultivation (Gal 2003; MOAG 2004).
In the Israeli context—abandoned land produces lower
environmental services than cultivated ﬁelds. As men-
tioned above, the Israeli public prefers the aesthetic value
of cultivated land to that of abandoned land. Un-ploughed
land exhibits poorer hydrological behavior, including a
lower inﬁltration rate (Lasanta and others 2000; Poyatos
and others 2003). Evidence from a number of Mediter-
ranean countries demonstrates that abandonment of cul-
tivation may lead to loss of habitats, creation of a lasting
phase of stressful conditions to the local ecosystem,
and therefore—detrimental effects to local biodiversity
(Poyatos and others 2003; Preiss and others 1997;
Romero-Calcerrada and Perry 2004; Scozzafava and de
Sanctis 2006).
As in many other places, Israeli agriculture also has a
negative impact on the environment, including impact
associatedwiththeuseofchemicalfertilizersandpesticides;
erosion due to cultivation; loss of habitats and connectivity
betweenopenspacesduetoconstructionofgreenhousesand
agricultural buildings; etc.
Protecting the Agri-Environment in Israel: To
Strengthen the Use of Economic Instruments?
Currently, Israel implements a mix of mandatory regula-
tions, economic instruments and advisory measures to
address a wide range of agri-environmental issues,
including protection of farmland against construction;
support of cultivation activities to prevent abandonment;
and mitigation of the negative impact of farming on the
environment.
The mechanisms that aim to protect Israeli farmland
against construction are based on mandatory regulations.
These include zoning and the activities of a special com-
mission—the Commission for Protection of Agricultural
Land (CPAL) (Feitelson 1999). Zoning is performed by
master plans at the national, regional and local levels,
which determine which land cannot be used for develop-
ment. In addition, the CPAL holds veto power over plans to
change the designation of farmland into land for con-
struction (Egoz 1996). These regulative instruments are
supported by an economic instrument integrated into the
land tenure system, which states that a lessee of state-
owned agricultural land (approximately 90% of farmland
in Israel) cannot ﬁnancially gain from its development.
Although these mechanisms were weakened over the years,
they are still powerful in protecting the Israeli farmland
against construction.
The policy instruments that support cultivation activities
against abandonment are also based on mandatory regula-
tions and economic instruments. The mandatory regula-
tions are integrated into the terms of lease of state-owned
farmland, which state that when the lessee stops cultivating
the land for longer than 3 years, the state may terminate the
contract and lease the land to another farmer. However, this
regulation has rarely been enforced (Gal 2003), among
other reasons, because the farmer’s house is considered an
integral part of the farm, and terminating the contract on
the farm means removing the farmer’s family from its
home—an act that Israeli ofﬁcials are reluctant to perform.
In addition to this mandatory regulation, Israel promotes
agricultural cultivation through ﬁnancial support for
farmers. In recent years this support has been relatively
modest, amounting to approximately 3% of the value of
agricultural production (MOAG 2006), in comparison with
around 32% of the production value in the EU (OECD
2006). The vehicle of support also differs between Israel
and the EU: whereas most of the agricultural support in the
EU is provided through income payments to farmers, in
Israel it is mainly provided through partial coverage of
investments in farms (Fig. 3) and by charging lower prices
for irrigation water than the price charged for water for
domestic use. Both mechanisms can lead to negative
environmental impacts, such as excessive use of scarce
water resources or construction of greenhouses and other
agricultural buildings in the otherwise open space. The
limited income payment programs are not anchored in laws
or regulations, but are rather negotiated annually between
farmers’ representatives and the authorities.
Policies that focus on mitigating the negative impacts of
farming on the environment are at the initial stages of
development in Israel, and comprise mandatory regula-
tions, economic instruments and advisory measures.
Around 30 environmental laws and regulations relate to
Table 1 The Israeli public’s willingness-to-pay for aesthetic quali-
ties of landscape types, ﬁndings of previous studies
Source WTP (NIS)
a
Shemesh-Adani (2003) 64.10–43.06
Shirizly (2001) 29.80
Fleischer and others (1997) 54.76–27.99
Total range 29.8–64.10
a NIS is the Israeli currency. All the values relate to a one-time
donation for preserving the landscape, and are inﬂation-adjusted for
2005
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123farming activities (MOEP 2007), covering issues such as
the prevention of hazards (noise, foul smells, water and air
pollution); use of dangerous materials (fertilizers and pes-
ticides); mitigation of waste caused by crops and livestock
cultivation; etc.
A number of Israeli Ministry of Agriculture ﬁnancial
support programs have shown positive environmental
impact (Table 2), although none bear the explicit title of
‘‘agri-environmental scheme’’, and the overall environ-
mental impact of the programs is not considered. In gen-
eral, these programs are well-accepted by the Israeli
farmers. The program for introducing environmental pro-
tection facilities into dairy farms was implemented in
1999–2006. By 2006, 46% of all Israeli dairy farms ful-
ﬁlled the required investments in waste treatment facilities
and other measures for preventing pollution from farm
waste (IDB 2006). As for the support program for invest-
ment in water systems and in low-irrigated plantations—
according to the ofﬁcial in charge of it, it proved to be
highly popular among farmers throughout all its years of
operation, and the number of applications always matched
or exceeded the available budget (E. Hadas, the invest-
ments administration, Israeli Ministry of Agriculture, oral
communication, 6 January 2010). The support for wheat
farming is provided to all farmers in the southern, arid
region of Israel, and is not managed through individual
contracts with farmers; therefore the rate of acceptance by
farmers is difﬁcult to determine.
Other changes in cultivation, to more environmentally-
beneﬁcial crops and/or methods (e.g., lower use of chemi-
cals, transition to organic farming etc.) are not ﬁnancially
supported in Israel at the moment, but are promoted through
the agricultural extension service and the governmental
agricultural research organization (S. Israel, Manager of the
Department for Plant Protection, the Israeli agricultural
extensionservice,oralcommunication,12November2008).
Detailed data regarding the success of these advisory mea-
sures is not available.
An important agri-environmental goal that the current
instruments do not address is promoting the positive
inﬂuences of agriculture on the environment (i.e., creation
of aesthetic landscape, protecting biodiversity, etc.). The
only program that currently relates to this aim involves
direct payments to wheat farmers in southern areas, which
also promotes aesthetic amenities. However, other envi-
ronmental impacts of wheat cultivation are not tackled
within the framework of this program, and its overall
environmental impact is debatable.
All of the above suggest that the current mechanisms
used in Israel to address the agri-environment are only
partly effective. Mandatory regulations seem to be effec-
tive in protecting open spaces; however, to be less effective
in preventing abandonment of ﬁelds. The current economic
instruments have low ecological effectiveness, as they may
encourage methods of cultivation that are not environ-
mentally beneﬁcial; the programs that have a positive
environmental impact are not explicitly considered ‘‘agri-
environmental schemes’’ and their overall environmental
effect may not be beneﬁcial. The Israeli Ministry of
Agriculture invests effort into the promotion of environ-
mentally sustainable cultivation through research and
extension, however the effectiveness of this effort has not
been systematically studied. One may presume that without
extra incentive, the farmers’ motivation to change their
cultivation is not high. The positive environmental effects
of agriculture are barely remunerated, and given the trend
of ﬁelds abandonment, may not be achieved in the long run
without suitable remuneration. Expanding the use of eco-
nomic instruments when addressing the agri-environment
holds potential for reaching more effective ecological
results.
Expanding the use of economic agri-environmental
instruments in Israel is feasible thanks to its developed
economy, which allows allocating public funds for pro-
moting the agri-environment, and the general acceptance of
this policy by the public at large, as demonstrated by the
WTP surveys presented above.
The farmers’ acceptance of economic agri-environ-
mental instruments can be judged based on the good
acceptance rate of the current programs, as well as on the
answers of the farmers interviewed within the pilot project
conducted at the Megido Regional Council. The latter form
a complex picture: on the one hand, 18 of the 21 farmers
who were interviewed stated that the government should
provide more assistance to farmers. However, 6 of them
objected to the government’s ﬁnancial support of farmers
Fig. 3 The vehicles of public support for agriculture in Israel.
Source: Adapted from MOAG (2006)
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123(3 expressed both support and opposition to the policy),
and 11 preferred that the government would assist the
farmers in alternative ways (i.e., grant a discount on prices
of irrigation water, construct agricultural infrastructure,
etc.). Six farmers preferred the use of advisory measures to
economic instruments, and 2 farmers preferred stricter use
of mandatory regulations. Only 2 farmers regarded the
implementation of economic instruments for addressing the
agri-environment positively, whereas 4 farmers stated that
promoting the agri-environment is not a good goal for
public funds (promoting intensive cultivation was consid-
ered a better goal).
The institutional feasibility of applying economic agri-
environmental instruments in Israel is limited by the fact
that farmers in this country currently receive very limited
payments. The development of a model for delivering
funds to farmers for promoting the Israeli agri-environment
is advisable.
Agri-Environmental Payment Schemes and Their
Potential in Israel
Experience gained in other countries may serve as a ref-
erence when developing economic agri-environmental
measures in Israel. The EU’s agri-environmental policy
was initiated by some member states as voluntary programs
from the early 1980s. The policy was made compulsory in
1992, with the integration of agri-environmental measures
as part of the ‘‘second pillar’’ of the Common Agricultural
Policy. Economic instruments play a major role within the
EU’s agri-environmental policy, with subsidies/support
schemes comprising a central measure (Bra ¨uer and others
2006). We will therefore focus on agri-environmental
schemes, although other economic instruments are just as
relevant.
Currently, the agri-environmental schemes are based on
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1698/2005, and are mutually
ﬁnanced by the EU and the individual member states,
which are responsible for their design and implementation
within rural development programs. Within the framework
of an agri-environmental scheme, farmers are usually
requested to perform certain actions that are considered
environmentally desirable, or refrain from carrying out
others. In return, they receive a payment that is calculated
on the basis of the estimated average opportunity costs, and
is usually uniform for all the participants in the program.
The farmers’ participation is voluntary, and is organized
through contracts between individual farmers and the
authorities. Participation in the program is rendered
attractive by remuneration that exceeds the calculated
opportunity costs (Marggraf 2000). The schemes aim to
achieve ecological results that surpass ‘‘good farming
practices’’, as deﬁned by the member states.
The conventional agri-environmental schemes, as prac-
ticed in the EU for about two decades, are centrally-plan-
ned, meaning that their ecological and economic
parameters are set by the authorities. Although the eco-
logical and economical effectiveness of these conventional
agri-environmental schemes was contested (Kleijn and
others 2006; Kleijn and Sutherland 2003; Marggraf 2003;
von Haaren and Bathke 2008; von Haaren and Bills 2007)
it seems reasonable to argue that they can contribute to
supporting the environmental beneﬁts of agriculture in
Israel, in addition to the instruments currently in use.
The feasibility of implementing agri-environmental
payment schemes in Israel is, however, complex. Some
institutional aspects support their implementation; for
example, a deﬁnition of ‘‘good agricultural practice’’ exists
within the framework of some 30 environmental laws and
regulations that relate to farming activities, as mentioned
above (MOEP 2007). However, other institutional aspects
restrict the implementation of agri-environmental payment
schemes. These emerge mainly from the prevailing vehicle
of support for farmers. Although in essence agri-environ-
mental payment schemes are not subsidies or income
Table 2 Israeli agricultural support programs with positive environmental impact, 2005
Program % of total agricultural
support, 2005
Type of support Environmental implication
The reform in the dairy branch 12.6 Support for investment in waste treatment
facilities in dairy farms
Treatment of dairy farms’ wastes
Investments improving the
efﬁciency of water use
1.7 Support for investment in water systems,
and low-irrigated plantation (olives)
Reduction in consumption of water
Direct payments to wheat
farmers in southern areas
9 Direct payments to wheat cultivators Cultivation of wheat ﬁelds as a means
of protecting open spaces
Total 23.3
Inclusion of a program in this table does not signify that its overall environmental impact is positive, only that it bears some positive
environmental impact. For example, direct payment to wheat farmers in southern Israel contribute to the protection of open spaces, however it
may also lead to other, less desirable environmental effects. Source: Authors’ analysis based on data in MOAG 2006
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the political acceptability of such measures may be greater
in an environment where there is a tradition of agricultural
subsidies. In Israel, on the contrary, income payments to
farmers are limited in scope, and are not well established
politically. It may be difﬁcult to establish a system of
income payments for promoting agri-environmental ser-
vices alone.
Another limitation to adopting agri-environmental pay-
ment schemes in Israel is the prevailing attitude of policy
makers, who oppose subsidies and promote market orien-
tation in the agricultural sector. This attitude is evident in
the drastic cutbacks in public support for farmers by almost
50% in the last decade (Natan 2007). This means that
although the Israeli public at large may support payments
for agri-environmental services (as demonstrated by WTP
surveys) the delivery of funds according to a centrally
planned, non-competitive model may not be accepted by
the public’s representatives. Consequently, a market-based
model that emphasizes competition between farmers is
called for.
Market-Based Instruments in Agri-Environmental
Schemes
The centrally-planned agri-environmental schemes were
criticized for their low level of effectiveness in achieving
ecological aims, particularly with regard to the improve-
ment of biodiversity (Kleijn and others 2006; Kleijn and
Sutherland 2003). They were also criticized for their
unsatisfactory cost-effectiveness, as their use of uniform
premiums leads to both over- and under-compensation of
farmers, due to different farm production costs and site
conditions (Marggraf 2003; von Haaren and Bathke 2008;
von Haaren and Bills 2007).
The integration of market economy components into the
schemes has recently been discussed with the aim of
improving them. These enhanced schemes have been par-
tially incorporated into the policy or implemented within
the framework of pilot projects (Gerowitt and others 2003a,
b; Hampicke 2006). Markets for agri-environmental ser-
vices are not as easy to establish as markets for private
goods, as most of the agri-environmental services are
public goods. Notwithstanding, it is possible to introduce
some market components into the design of agri-environ-
mental schemes (Gerowitt and others 2003a, b; Hampicke
2006), such as: (a) Result-oriented remuneration (Briemle
2000; Matzdorf 2004; Wittig and others 2006); (b) The use
of conservation auctions (Groth 2007; Latacz-Lohmann
and Van der Hamsvoort 1997); (c) Public participation in
deﬁning the demand for environmental services (Mu ¨ller
and others 2002); and (d) Local organization (Bauer 2006;
Eggers 2005). These instruments are detailed in brief
below, and the possibility of their implementation in Israel
is subsequently discussed.
Result-Oriented Remuneration
The consumers of agri-environmental services are inter-
ested in the ecological results, and not only in the activities
carried out by the farmers (Gerowitt and others 2003a, b;
Hampicke 2006). Therefore, remuneration should be given
for the actual effects of agriculture on the environment, and
not merely for activities considered appropriate, as is the
case in the conventional action-oriented agri-environmen-
tal schemes. For example, in the case of livestock farmers,
the action-oriented programs may pay them to graze their
herds in order to sustain grassland biodiversity. On the
other hand, a result-oriented scheme would pay the farmers
for the actual presence of ﬂora and fauna in their ﬁeld,
regardless of how it came into existence.
In addition to improving the environmental effective-
ness of the schemes, result-orientation also supports
farmers’ environmental innovation, as they are not pro-
vided with guidelines for the production of the environ-
mental service, and can develop the conservation protocols
individually (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 2005). Result-
orientation may also promote the farmers’ interest in
environmental problems, as well as cooperation between
farmers in the quest for their solution (Matzdorf 2004). The
absence of restrictions on farmers’ actions may promote
their acceptance of the schemes (Klimek and others 2008).
The feasibility of a result-oriented approach is condi-
tional on two central factors (Bertke and others 2005;
Gerowitt and others 2003a, b; Matzdorf 2004; Wittig and
others 2006): that the results are deﬁned in a clearly
measurable way, so that identiﬁcation and monitoring may
be easily performed; and that the results are associated with
a particular ﬁeld and producer, to enable the farmer to
prove that he/she supplied it (Bertke and others 2005;
Briemle 2000; Wittig and others 2006). Usually, a result-
oriented project employs a set of indicators as proof of
environmental result attainment. Weed species on arable
land, or herb species in grassland, may be a good indicator
of the attainment of agricultural biodiversity (Bertke and
others 2005; Briemle 1999; Matzdorf 2004; Wittig and
others 2006). Other indicators that have been used in result-
oriented schemes include meadow bird clutches or
carnivore offspring (Musters and others 2000; Zabel and
Holm-Mueller 2008).
Result-oriented agri-environmental schemes for the
promotion of plant diversity in grasslands are currently
implemented within the framework of agri-environmental
schemes in some federal states in Germany and in
Switzerland (Oppermann and Gujer 2003; Schwarz and
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Bush Tender program in Australia (DSE 2008).
Conservation Auctions
Auctions, practiced as public tenders, can serve as an
appropriate instrument for the efﬁcient allocation of public
money in exchange for the provision of environmental
services, in the same way as they are used in the provision
of other public goods by private ﬁrms (Stoneham and
others 2003). Policymakers lack information about the
production conditions of the single farmer. Auctions pro-
vide a mechanism for ﬂexible allocation of public money
based on the farmers’ individual production costs (Ferraro
2008; Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997;
Mello and others 1998). In an agri-environmental scheme
that employs auctions, each farmer calculates the produc-
tion costs of the agri-environmental service individually,
and then submits a bid in response to a public tender. The
farmers offering the lowest bids will be accepted into the
program, and the payments will be made according to their
bids.
Conservation auctions have been implemented in some
speciﬁc programs in the USA and in Australia, as well as in
some experimental projects in Europe and elsewhere (CJC
Consultants 2004; Jack and others 2008; Kirwan and others
2005; Klimek and others 2008; Stoneham and others 2003;
von Haaren and Bathke 2008). Article 39 of the Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1698/2005 recommends the use of
auctions for agri-environmental services, provided they
increase the efﬁciency of the scheme.
Participatory Approach
The price, as an indicator of value and scarcity, is an
important principle of the market system. Principally, the
price of speciﬁc agri-environmental goods should be
determined as an equilibrium between their value to the
public and their production costs, and not solely according
to the production costs, as is usually the case in the con-
ventional agri-environmental schemes (Gerowitt and others
2003a, b). Within the framework of a market-oriented agri-
environmental scheme, the upper limit of the sum of the
remuneration given to the farmers should be determined by
the value of the agri-environmental service they provide to
the public (as the production costs are the lower limit). In
order to determine this value, it is necessary to implement a
participatory approach in setting the economic parameters
of the scheme, for example, using sophisticated assessment
methods to determine the population’s willingness to pay
for agri-environmental services. Such surveys can consti-
tute a participatory mechanism, as long as their results are
integrated into the policy design. Another way of
considering the public’s preferences is engaging a com-
mission of relevant local stakeholders to represent the
public demand and to decide on the detailed design of the
scheme (Bertke and others 2005; Gerowitt and others
2003a, b; Musgrave 1956/57, Rueffer 2007).
In addition to expressing the actual demand for agri-
environmental services, a participatory approach in agri-
environmental policies helps mediate interests between
groups, thus ensuring that the aims of the policy are
accepted by many. It also improves the amount and quality
of information that the decisions are based upon by bene-
ﬁting from the knowledge of local laypersons (Prager and
Freese 2009). Public participation allows policy makers to
gain insight into the social network that will be required to
implement the policy, and thus understand the probability
of their acceptance (Newig and others 2005).
Public participation in the design of environmental
policy has been promoted by Agenda 21 and by the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity. In the EU, public partic-
ipation constitutes the core concept of the Aarhus
Convention and its resulting European legislation. EU
member states are now required to integrate citizens’ par-
ticipation into various policy areas; examples include ‘‘the
leader concept’’ in EC Council Regulation No. 1698/2005
and the Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC.
Local Organization
Natural conditions and land use types differ widely
between regions. So do public preferences; hence the
willingness to pay for agri-environmental services
(Marggraf 2000). This calls for the local organization of
agri-environmental schemes, in line with the European
Union’s principle of subsidiarity (Groth 2007; Prager and
Freese 2009).
Although local organization is not strictly a market-
based measure, some market-based instruments are easier
to operate, and may yield more accurate results when
practiced on a local basis. It is easier to conduct willing-
ness-to-pay surveys on a small scale, and their results will
better match the particular ecological features of the area.
A set of ecological indicators for the practice of result-
orientation can be more accurately developed, given a
speciﬁc area with its particular ecological characteristics.
Some evaluations of agri-environmental measures demon-
strate the good results of local and site speciﬁc measures, in
contrast to more global ones (von Haaren and Bathke
2008).
Although these market-based instruments have been
advocated by European academics for almost a decade,
they are actually integrated into policy only in a number of
countries or regions. Indeed, these instruments are not
without faults. Result-orientation faces the problems of
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unclear landholder responsibility, and is therefore practi-
cable for only a number of environmental beneﬁts, such
as plant biodiversity (Klimek and others 2008; Latacz-
Lohmann and Schilizzi 2005). It also exposes the farmers
to risks, as the effects of management changes on the
environment are not always clear, and the impact of
unexpected climate events cannot be predicted. In fact,
result-orientation shifts the risk of lower environmental
effectiveness away from the government and onto the
farmers, and may reduce the level of acceptance of the
scheme by risk averse farmers (Latacz-Lohmann and
Schilizzi 2005). In addition, it may be maintained that
ensuring a positive environmental outcome should include
overall environmental assessment of the measure, not only
measurement of a speciﬁc result pursued. There are cases
in which the speciﬁed environmental goal is achieved, but
at a cost of negative environmental impact (this is an
overall problem of any measure aiming at speciﬁc prob-
lems, not only result oriented instruments).
A conservation auction is a complex incentive mecha-
nism with a higher risk of failure in comparison to a ﬂat-
rate scheme (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 2005). The use
of auctions is expected to be more complex to administer,
entail higher transaction costs to farmers and the admin-
istration and require higher human capital to design and
implement (Ferraro 2008; Latacz-Lohmann and Van der
Hamsvoort 1998; Lowell and others 2007). Auctions are
probably worth their administrative costs only when there
is a high degree of information asymmetry, heterogeneity
of costs among farmers, and a large pool of bidders to
induce competitive pressures (Ferraro 2008; Latacz-
Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1998); this is often not
the case in targeted sites, where high environmental assets
are concentrated in a small area (Stoneham and others
2003). The use of auctions does not prevent the farmers
from getting payments that exceed their reservation rents
(Kirwan and others 2005). When conservation auctions are
issued repeatedly, their contribution to economic efﬁciency
diminishes, as the winning price level reaches that of
the price the administration was willing to pay under a
ﬁxed-rate scheme (Lowell and others 2007; Schilizzi and
Latacz-Lohmann 2007). Auctions also run the risk of being
perceived as unfair by farmers (Latacz-Lohmann and
Schilizzi 2005).
As for public participation—a number of technical
problems are involved in the implementation of this
principle. Often, the authorities do not know who to
involve, when and for which purpose. Established orga-
nizations often oppose participatory approaches, as they
may bring about a reallocation of power, budgets or other
limited resources (Prager and Freese 2009). Participation
is associated with additional efforts and costs on the part
of the authorities, and is exposed to misuse by decision
makers with hidden agendas: some may choose to draw
out a public participation process in order to delay the
implementation of challenging policies; others may utilize
public participation forums as arenas for displaying their
political power, rather than focusing on the issue at hand.
Consequently, a participatory process might hinder quick
and effective implementation of a needed policy (Newig
and others 2005). In addition, relying on a public par-
ticipation mechanism subjects the valuation of experts to
that of the public; the ecological service in question must
beneﬁt from broad societal demand, otherwise its con-
servation would not be supported, even if conservation
experts believe it is of high value (Klimek and others
2008).
As for local organization, some centralized administra-
tive systems do not support the implementation of this
principle, as will be demonstrated by the Israeli case study.
The Potential of Market-Based Agri-Environmental
Instruments in Israel
The potential of the market-oriented agri-environmental
instruments in Israel was studied within the framework of
the pilot project carried out at Megido Regional Council.
We present the institutional feasibility of implementing
each instrument, its acceptance by the project’s stake-
holders (farmers, and policy makers as representatives of
the larger public), and its effectiveness (ecological and/or
economical). We will mostly consider the perceived
effectiveness of the instruments (as perceived by our
interviewees), since exploring the actual ecological and
economic effectiveness was beyond the scope of this study
(some aspects of the actual effectiveness are planned to be
studied in a follow up project). A summary of the argu-
ments in favor and against using market-oriented instru-
ments, as raised by our interviewees, is presented in
Table 3.
Result-Oriented Remuneration
Using a result-oriented approach is institutionally feasible
in Israel, as payments for farmers within the existing pro-
grams are usually conditional on performance. Remuner-
ation for investments in farms (a main instrument of
farmers’ support in Israel) is not paid before the farmer has
proven that he/she has actually made the investments.
However, public support is not conditional on improved
agricultural achievements (e.g., better yields), and in this
sense may not be considered result-oriented. Similarly,
in the environmental policy, polluters are sometimes
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of investments in a relevant technology; however, payment
is not conditional on actual environmental results (for
example, a lower level of pollution).
In line with the institutional framework, the prominent
attitude towards result-orientation among the policy mak-
ers in the survey was supportive (supported by 6 of 9 policy
makers); in contrast, only 4 farmers were unequivocally in
favor of this approach. It is worth noting that many inter-
viewees (3 policy makers and 6 farmers) perceived result-
orientation as a means of enforcement, ensuring that the
farmers do what they have undertaken to do before getting
paid. In this sense, it may be considered as improving the
economic effectiveness of the scheme (public money will
only be given to farmers who perform the required tasks).
Although mostly perceived as a merit, one policy maker
stated that when associated with enforcement, result-ori-
entation may be rejected by the farmers, as they might
deduce that the government does not trust the farmers to
fulﬁll their commitments. Only one interviewee in our
survey (the representative of the forestry authority)
understood the approach as an instrument for achieving
Table 3 Arguments in favor and against using market-oriented instruments, as expressed by the project’s stakeholders
Instrument Type of
argument
Arguments Farmers Policy
makers
Total
Result
orientation
In favor A necessary instrument of enforcement, to ensure the farmers will fulﬁll their
obligations within the project
46 1 0
Conditioning the payment on performance is an established institutional regulation, the
authorities may not be able to transfer payments to farmers without proof of
performance
–1 1
Environmental effectiveness – 1 1
Against Some farmers lack the initial funds for starting the project 3 – 3
The government cannot be trusted to pay after the farmer has already produced the
results
21 3
The farmer may encounter unexpected difﬁculties in producing the desired results – 2 2
Conservation
auction
In favor Allowing policy makers to objectively select who will participate in the project and how
much money they will be paid
–4 4
Matching the level of payment to the needs of the farmers 1 2 3
Obligating the farmers to make an effort, so that the farmers who will ultimately take
part in the project will be those who are willing to invest serious effort
11 2
Against Most of the farmers do not know how to calculate their production costs, and are
incapable of submitting reliable bids
56 1 1
Large and successful farmers can compete better because they can allow themselves to
earn less; smaller farmers will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to compete
34 7
An auction transmits a message that the authorities do not really want to support the
farmers
41 5
Public
participation
In favor Expanding the acceptance of policy 1 4 5
Getting ideas that can improve the policy 1 3 4
Improving the relations between farmers and the public at large 1 2 3
Against Introducing uncertainty into the policy 0 2 2
Bias due to particular interests 0 2 2
Difﬁculty in resolving disagreements between the public and the policy makers 0 2 2
Local
organization
a
In favor Adaptation to local conditions and needs – 4 4
Establishing local partnerships – 3 3
Enhancing implementation efﬁciency – 1 1
Against Local authorities cannot operate without national support – 2 2
The local administration may interfere too much in individual farmers’ operations – 1 1
Creating excessive bureaucracy – 1 1
The number indicates the number of interviewees who voiced the argument. Some interviewees voiced more than one argument, whereas others
did not voice any. The 3 most often voiced arguments for each category are presented
a Only policy makers were asked about this instrument
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results).
Objections to the approach were raised mainly by the
farmers. Three farmers said that the funds for starting the
environmental project were not always available to farm-
ers, and therefore they should receive public assistance in
the early stages of the project. Two farmers (and one policy
maker) said that farmers do not trust the government to
transfer payment after they had already fulﬁlled their
environmental commitments. One farmer (and one policy
maker) stated that environmental results take a long time to
achieve, and the farmers cannot wait that long for
payments.
The questions of measuring the results and the respon-
sibility for the risk of failure to achieve them, as raised in
the literature dealing with result-orientation (Latacz-Loh-
mann and Schilizzi 2005) were seldom raised in our survey
(one policy maker related to the ﬁrst, and two to the sec-
ond). When provoked with the question of the risk imposed
on farmers by the approach, six policy makers and one
farmer rejected the idea, saying that they trusted the agri-
cultural experts that provide professional support during
the project to design the cultivation protocol in a manner
ensuring that the farmers will deliver the requested results.
Only two policy makers acknowledged that the farmers
may fail to deliver the required results, due to reasons that
are not within their control, and maintained that in this
case—the farmers should be remunerated for their efforts
regardless.
Did result-orientation improve the ecological effec-
tiveness of the project? A major environmental problem
that the project was meant to mitigate was soil erosion.
As this goal cannot be associated with a speciﬁc producer
or farm, and is difﬁcult to measure, it cannot be addressed
via a strict result-oriented approach. Another environ-
mental service that was promoted within the project
involved creating aesthetic landscapes, and to this end, a
number of guidelines were established regarding the
design of the olive groves. This environmental service can
be delivered using a result-oriented approach, as the
groves’ association with a single farm and grower cannot
be questionable, and the design and composition of the
desirable grove can be determined in a measurable way
(e.g., specifying the interval between trees, their height,
etc.). However, such a deﬁnition of the landscape quali-
ties of the grove does not leave the farmer much room for
innovation, which is one of the goals of result-orientation.
Regarding protection of biodiversity—as the impact of the
groves on biodiversity required further study, the project’s
managers preferred not to condition the payment on
results in this aspect. In sum, result-orientation improved
the effectiveness of the project only regarding landscape
aesthetics.
Conservation Auctions
Tenders have a long tradition in the Israeli governance sys-
tem, due to many years of tendering obligation instituted
within the framework of the Municipalities Ordinance,
governmental regulations (Shalev 1989), and ﬁnally, by the
‘‘Law of Obligatory Tendering-1992’’. Consequently, it is
institutionally feasible to announce tenders for the supply of
agri-environmental services as well. The innovation of the
pilot project at the Megido Regional Council lies in basing
payment to farmers for agri-environmental beneﬁts on the
established tendering obligation. Tenders are not usually
issued in the agricultural sector, where farmers are given
assistance based on ﬂat-rates that are set by the government,
and according to a ‘‘ﬁrst-comes-ﬁrst-served’’ principle. Our
interviews revealed that the only semi-agricultural organi-
zation that often announces tenders is the forestry authority,
when it allocates cultivation and tree-clearing rights in for-
ests. Issuing a tender to buy agri-environmental beneﬁts
encapsulates a change in approach—considering these ben-
eﬁts as public services, and purchasing them from farmers
using the institutional instrument that is legally suitable for
such a purchase. In the pilot project, the farmers were asked
to compete on the share of public remuneration for their
investment in planting the olive groves.
Although more than half of the policy makers involved
in the project supported the use of auctions (5 of 9 policy
makers), 16 of the 21 interviewed farmers opposed it. The
most important argument in favour of using an auction,
raised by 4 policy makers, was that an auction is a nec-
essary instrument for making public decisions fairly and
transparently; it allows the authorities to objectively select
the participants in the project, and the level of payment that
they will receive.
Many more arguments were raised against the conser-
vation auction than in favor of it (5 in favor, 12 against).
The most prominent argument against the auction was that
the farmers do not know their production cost, and there-
fore cannot submit realistic bids; this was suspected of
leading to detrimental social and environmental outcomes:
If bids that are unrealistically low are awarded in the
auction, the farmers who had submitted them would either
not be able to fulﬁll their commitments at the expense of
the environment, or fulﬁll them at a risk to their livelihood.
Other important arguments against the auction were that
it favors large and successful farmers over smaller ones;
and that it transmits a message suggesting that the
authorities do not truly want to support the farmers. It
seems that in the current atmosphere in Israel, where
agricultural subsidies were drastically cut back, farmers
yearn for public acknowledgment of their service to soci-
ety. When the authorities set the level of remunera-
tion it was as if they were determining the value of
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vation auction might make it appear as though the farmers
are bargaining for public charity—an image that the Israeli
farmers would be reluctant to be associated with.
It is difﬁcult to judge whether the auction in our project
improved its economical effectiveness, since there was no
compatible centrally-planned scheme to compare it to.
However, it should be noted that the auction was not per-
ceived by our interviewees as improving the project’s
effectiveness. Indeed, our interviewees did not refer to the
auction from the perspectives of cost-effectiveness or
saving public funds, and when provoked with this idea—
they rejected it as unimportant or misleading. For example,
the Regional Council’s architect mentioned that the obli-
gation to issue tenders and select contractors according to
their bids often lowers the quality of the service delivered
to the public. In the context of the pilot project, she raised
the concern that farmers might submit bids that are too low,
wouldn’t deliver the environmental goods, and ‘‘you end
up wasting public funds’’.
Despite its not being well accepted by the project’s
stakeholders, the conservation auction was implemented in
the project, since the tendering method is integrated into
the regulative system in Israel, and was considered by the
stakeholders to be the only legitimate way for local
authorities to transfer money to private entities (farmers).
Participatory Approach
Public participation in policy decision making in Israel
today is realized mainly within the framework of spatial
planning. According to the ‘‘Law of Planning and Con-
struction-1965’’ spatial plans that receive preliminary
approval by the planning authorities must be open to public
scrutiny, and those who feel harmed by them may ﬁle an
objection. In addition to this formal mechanism, a more
informal approach has been implemented by the planning
authorities in recent years, and many plans are accompa-
nied by a process of public hearings, preference surveys,
consultations with focus groups, etc. (Kaplan 2004).
Public participation has thus far been limited to the
regulatory system, and is seldom practiced by the initiatory
system (Soen 1997). The latter includes the ministries in
charge of development (Housing, Trade and Industry,
Agriculture) and other governmental and semi-govern-
mental bodies that initiate and implement development
projects. Within the agricultural sector, farmers’ organi-
zations are active in many decision making bodies, how-
ever the public at large is less involved in this process.
Providing this background, it may be said that a partici-
patory approach in the design of agri-environmental
scheme is more feasible when the public intended to be
involved comprises the farmers, and less so when the
public at large is considered.
The policy makers in the survey were generally sup-
portive of the idea of public participation (7 of 9 inter-
viewees); however, the approach was much less popular
among the farmers, and only one of them was willing to
unreservedly consider it. The supporting interviewees
regarded public participation as a way of increasing the
acceptance of the policy, improving it and strengthening
the relations between the farming and non-farming popu-
lation in the area. The perceived disadvantages of the
approach were: introducing uncertainty into policy; the
possibility of bias in the policy according to particular
interests; and the difﬁculty involved in case of disagree-
ments between the public’s attitude and that of policy
makers.
Notwithstanding their general support of public partic-
ipation, 6 policy makers raised a number of issues con-
cerning this approach, such as: in which questions to
involve the public; how to manage the process; and whom
to include in it. The last point was discussed at length—
should the participating public include the local or broader
public; whether to also include the people who have
ﬁnancial interests in the project; and how to avoid
involving only those who have clear political agendas. The
question whether to involve the farmers or the public at
large was a central one. Three policy makers and 3 farmers
said that only the farmers should be involved in the pro-
cess; they were concerned that the public at large did not
have enough agricultural knowledge to contribute to the
process.
Although not stated openly, it may be assumed that the
perception of the general relations between farmers and
non-farmers inﬂuenced the farmers’ attitude toward the
involvement of the public in the design of the scheme.
Thirteen farmers in our survey (and 5 policy makers)
claimed that the general public was hostile to the farmers in
questions relating to the use of natural resources and public
budgets. Five farmers (and 2 policy makers) claimed that
the public was unwilling to ﬁnancially support farming; 5
policy makers and one farmer stated that even those sectors
of the Israeli public who appreciate the environmental
services of agriculture perceive them as self evident and are
unaware of the investment needed to sustain them. Given
this perception of the public attitude, it is of little wonder
that the majority of the interviewed farmers considered
trying to involve the public at large in designing an agri-
environmental payment scheme as an ineffective approach.
A participatory approach can potentially improve the
economical effectiveness of the scheme by setting its
economic parameters in relation to the public’s demand
and willingness-to-pay. Due to the pilot project’s budgetary
constraints, it was impossible to conduct a WTP survey in
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designing the scheme. However, the project’s stakeholders
were consulted on the feasibility and beneﬁts of imple-
menting this instrument. Although acknowledging the
possibilities of translating public preferences into eco-
nomic values, only 2 policy makers (and none of the
farmers) supported the idea of setting the budget according
to the preferences of the general public. The objecting in-
terviewees argued that the public’s stated willingness-to-
pay is not based on real economic considerations, is
unstable, and is sometimes biased by particular interests.
A participatory approach was therefore not perceived
as contributing to the economical effectiveness of the
scheme.
Local Organization
When examining the institutional feasibility of organizing
agri-environmental schemes in Israel on a local basis, one
should note that the governance system in Israel is rather
centralized. For example, most of the Ministry of Agri-
culture’s decisions are made on the national level, despite
the fact that the country is divided into 5 agricultural
districts. Although the districts manage independent
research and extension services, they do not have inde-
pendent budgets, and they can only submit recommen-
dations to the central administration on issues involving
the allocation of ﬁnancial support to farmers. Local
organization exists within the realm of open-space man-
agement, for example, in the form of watershed admin-
istrations. These are often voluntary organizations that
unite a number of municipalities in order to manage a
river basin and the open spaces associated with it. How-
ever, these are also mainly advisory boards, with no
statutory power or budgetary authority.
As for local governance, in the urban sector, governance
is administered either at the national level or at the muni-
cipal level. In the rural sector, there is an intermediate level
of governance, since villages are grouped together and
governed by one ‘‘regional council’’. In total, there are 54
regional councils in Israel, ranging broadly in size, from 3
to 4,000 sq km, and from 3 to 63 villages (ICBS 2005). The
division of authority between the villages and their
respective regional councils is not clearly deﬁned in Israeli
legislation (Applebaum 2002). In the past, the regional
councils had very little effective governance capabilities,
and each village managed its educational system, envi-
ronmental services, etc. independently. However, since the
1990s, following an economic crisis in the rural sector that
made it impossible for many villages to continue providing
municipal services independently, the regional councils
assumed more and more municipal roles. At present, most
of the regional councils provide educational and cultural
services, some environmental services and some services to
the farmers (Applebaum 2002). When exploring the insti-
tutional feasibility of establishing an agri-environmental
policy in Israel at the local level, the regional councils
seem to be the obvious policy agent (and indeed were
advocated as such by 3 interviewees).
Local organization was considered too broad a policy
issue to be discussed with farmers, and therefore only the
policy makers were asked about this instrument. In general,
our interviewees strongly supported a local organization
approach in agri-environmental policy (8 of 9 interviews).
The interviewees perceived the local organization approach
as improving the effectiveness of the scheme, both eco-
nomically and ecologically, by facilitating implementation,
improving adaptation to local conditions and needs, and
establishing local partnerships. Two interviewees advo-
cated a mixed approach, such as setting the policy princi-
ples at the national level, but designing the schemes, or
managing them, at the local level.
However, in practice, local organization was only par-
tially implemented in the pilot project. Indeed, the project
was executed on the local scale; however, national policy
makers followed the process throughout its stages, within
the framework of the steering committee’s activities. In
some cases (e.g., the question of ﬂat-rate versus auction
design) the national policy makers’ attitude was considered
as having veto power, which effectively determined the
decisions made.
An examination of the criteria of choice between mea-
sures, as suggested in our conceptual framework, reveals
that the only market-based instrument that was considered
by our interviewees as improving the effectiveness of the
project was local organization. Our interviewees doubted
that a conservation auction or a participatory approach may
enhance the economic effectiveness of the project. Result-
orientation, considered as a means of enforcement, was
perceived as improving the effectiveness of the scheme;
however, its inﬂuence on ecological results was barely
considered by the interviewees.
As for feasibility of implementation—result-orientation
and conservation auction are institutionally feasible within
the Israeli system, and indeed were integrated into the
pilot project (at least partially), unlike the participatory
approach and local organization, that are less in line with
the Israeli institutional infrastructure. As for acceptance—
there seemed to be strong disagreement between the policy
makers in our study (as representatives of the general
public’s view) and the farmers. The policy makers con-
sidered all the market-based instruments appropriate,
whereas the farmers rejected the instruments they were
presented with. This raises the question of whose accep-
tance has higher priority in the design and success of an
agri-environmental scheme.
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This paper discussed the pathway of choosing policy
measures to address the agri-environment. We suggested a
broad conceptual framework, examining the general policy
measures that can be used to tackle the agri-environment
(mandatory regulations; economic instruments; advisory
measures); then focusing on the economic instruments, and
speciﬁcally on market-based ones. We suggested that there
are two criteria of choice between the measures and
instruments: the instrument’s contribution to enhancing the
effectiveness of the policy (whether economical or eco-
logical); and the feasibility of its implementation.
We followed this conceptual framework to explore the
development of agri-environmental policy instruments in
Israel. At the moment, Israel is implementing a combina-
tion of mandatory regulations, economic instruments and
advisory measures in its handling of the agri-environment.
However, economic instruments are under-represented (in
comparison with other developed economies, especially the
EU) and may contribute to more effective environmental
impact. The feasibility of introducing more economic
instruments into the agri-environmental policy in Israel is,
however, complex—on the one hand, they are accepted by
the public (as demonstrated in WTP surveys); but on the
other hand—payment schemes do not suit the institutional
infrastructure in which subsidies to farmers are not an
established practice.
Following further discussion of the current political
atmosphere, in which farmers are asked to be more market-
oriented, we concluded that market-based instruments have
a higher feasibility of implementation in Israel than cen-
trally-planned schemes. Within the framework of a pilot
project, we implemented four market-based instruments
that are being utilized in other countries, and studied the
feasibility of their implementation, and their perceived
impact on the policy’s effectiveness. We found that the
scheme’s stakeholders do not regard market-based instru-
ments as tools that may improve the effectiveness of the
scheme, either economically or ecologically. It seems that
the question of effectiveness was hardly on the minds of
the policy makers and farmers involved in our project, and
other arguments should have been used to convince them
of the merits of the market-based instruments.
As for feasibility—the main conclusion is that the
instruments that are in line with the existing institutional
framework are also those that stand a good chance of being
implemented,regardlessoftheiracceptancebythescheme’s
stakeholders. This is demonstrated by choosing the conser-
vation auction that was rejected by the farmers and won the
acceptance of only half of the policy makers, but was nev-
ertheless integrated into the project because it has already
been institutionally established; and in the case of local
organization—which was perceived by many interviewees
as contributing to the effectiveness of the scheme, but
was not included in the project because it contradicted the
customary institutional framework in Israel.
Another ﬁnding regarding the feasibility of implemen-
tation is the contradictions found between the acceptance
of instruments by farmers and policy makers, which may
reﬂect more general disagreements between the farmers
and the public at large. The policy makers in our survey
were more supportive of market-based instruments than the
farmers, and the question then arises which group should
be consulted when designing agri-environmental schemes.
Following the course of our conceptual framework leads
us to the conclusion that a reasonable criterion such as
improving the ecological and economic effectiveness of a
policy does not necessarily lead to higher chances of its
implementation, at least in Israel. Institutional feasibility
and acceptance by the relevant stakeholders constitute
stronger criteria for the development of agri-environmental
policy measures, and should be taken into account in their
design.
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